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by 
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The purpose of this thesis is to explore Nietzschean 
values as they appear in three modern allegories: Franz 
Kafka's The Castle, Albert Camus' The Plague, and Nikos 
Kazantzakis' Zorba the Greek. The intent is to illustrate 
Friedrich Nietzsche's three stages of the overman as they 




Why does man value what he values? In one form or 
another, this apparently simple question has haunted and 
provoked my thinking for the last six years--leading me to 
wander into the labyrinths of theology, philosophy, and 
literature in hope of finding a cogent, satisfying answer. 
I soon learned that labyrinths frustrated me the most when 
I felt I had somewhere to go, somewhere beyond the laby­
rinth--like "heaven" or "truth." I also learned it is all 
too easy to overlook the beauty of the labyrinth itself when 
I focused my energy and value on something outside the maze. 
Unlike. Theseus--who was given only one thread by Ariadne 
to lead him through Minos' labyrinth--I have two threads 
guiding and focusing me on a path through this thesis, my 
present labyrinth: Angus Fletcher's theory of allegory and 
Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy of value. Fletcher taught 
me that allegory fuses together art and philosophy into a 
mode of expression which often transcends both disciplines. 
Nietzsche taught me, above all, that we should seek to 
understand this labyrinth-like world for what it really 
is--a labyrinth--and, then, embrace every part of it. My 
intention is to wind these two threads, allegory and value, 
into one by examining the value systems in allegorical lit­
erature, concentrating on modern works directly influenced by 
Nietzsche's allegory, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
Chapter One of this thesis is a definition of my first 
thread, allegory. Based on Fletcher's seminal work on the 
genre, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode, it sets up 
the criteria for determining if a work of literature is an 
allegory or not. By emphasizing the double intention of 
allegory, the daemonic, allegorical agent, and the cosmic, 
allegorical image, we can then apply these three specific 
aspects to the allegories treated in Chapters Two through 
Four. 
Chapter Two--my second thread--is a comparative study 
of two distinct views of value, the Christian and the Exis­
tential value systems. In The Faerie QueenQ, Edmund Spenser 
straps the values of renaissance Christianity on his charac­
ters for the same reason Icarus straps on his waxen wings: 
they both concentrate their energy on getting out of the 
labyrinth--this world--because their values remain outside 
the walls of the maze. Nietzsche's Zarathustra is Icarus 
fallen to earth: he concentrates his energy on exploring, 
fighting, and, finally, embracing the labyrinth. Spenser's 
Christian value system provides the necessary foil, while 
Nietzsche's Existential value system provides the essential 
pattern for the study of modern allegorical literature in 
the final two chapters of this thesis. 
Chapters Three and Four weave the two threads through 
three examples of modern allegorical literature: Franz 
Kafka's The Castle, Albert Camus' The Plague, and Nikos 
Kazantzakis' Zorba The Greek. The first thread, allegory, 
2 
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supplies the criteria for determining if the three novels are 
allegorical works. Nietzsche's philosophy of value, my second 
thread, supplies an interpretive pattern--the three stages of 
development his overman must pass through--which I apply to 
the novels in the fourth, and final, chapter of this thesis. 
To claim that the primary motive of Kafka, Camus, and 
Kazantakis in writing their respective allegories was their 
desire to portray a definite stage of Nietzsche's overman 
would greatly over-simplify three richly diverse novels. 
I contend, however, that all three writers were greatly 
affected by Nietzsche's philosophy, and that they all had 
Nietzsche's central question in their mind when they wrote 
their allegories: what is man to do when he realizes that 
the labyrinth is all there is? 
4 
CHAPTER I 
A DEFINITION OF ALLEGORY 
-- Allego��e-0 ake na� le-0/2 onten the dull 
-0y-0tem-0 that they ake keputed to be than 
they ake -0ymbol�c powe� -0t�uggle-0. --
Angus Fletcher 
Allegory, as Angus Fletcher so incisively put it, is a 
"protean device,"
1 
able to change its shape and form without 
losing the essential aspects which constitute allegorical 
literature. Allegory is such an eclectic mode of expression 
that defining it is about as easy as catching a fly with a 
pair of forceps--but there are certain conventions which allow 
the reader to determine if a work is allegorical or not. The 
central reason for allegory's eclectic nature is that form is 
not one of the conventions: allegory appears in all genres of 
literature, from epic to lyric to romance to drama. Without a 
formal criteria for allegory, the critic is forced to rely on 
the content and intention of the work if he is to determine if 
it is an example of allegorical fiction. Although the defini­
tion of allegory in this chapter mainly concerns the content 
and intention of the mode, a discussion of the etymology and 
history of the term is necessary to understand fully the 
nature of allegory as it appears in literature. 
Etymology and History of the Term 
The term allegory compounds two Greek words: allos, 
which means other, and agoreuin, which means to speak openly 
in the assembly or marketplace. By prefixing agoreuin with 
allos, the sense of the word is inverted; therefore, allegory 
means to speak other than openly or "speaking otherwise that 
2 one seems to speak." The connotative use of the word is to 
speak of one subject in terms of another; this nuance of the 
word is essential because allegory relies so heavily on 
double intention, which I will discuss later in this chapter. 
6 
The first critical treatment of the term allegory appears 
in 46 B.C., in Cicero's Orator: 
When there is a continuous stream of metaphors, 
a wholly different style of speech is producedr 
consequently the Greeks call it . . "allegory." 
They are right as to the name, but from the point 
of view of classification Aristotle does better 
in calling them metaphors. 3 
This statement lays the foundation for the traditional defini-
tion of allegory as an extended metaphor. If metaphor is a 
comparative ''transfer" of meaning between two unlike classes, 
usually movi�g between the concrete and abstract levels, 
then the assertion that allegory is a continuous metaphor 
extended throughout a given work is not only justified but 
essential to any definition of all0gory. 
Quintilian, the next rhetorician to discuss the term, 
accepts Cicero's definition as fundamentally true, but he 
expands on this foundation by adding the essential point 
that "Allegory . . . either presents one thing in words and 
another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to 
the meaning of the words. 11 4 Quintilian recognized the im­
plied, connotative meaning of the term (that it very often 
says one thing while meaning another), an insight that takes 
into account both the double intention and the use of irony 
in allegorical literature. 
Cicero's and Quintilian's classical definition of alle­
gory as an extended metaphor remained virtually unquestioned 
throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, not receiving 
much attention until the Romantic period and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge. Although Coleridge does not disagree with the 
traditional definition of allegory, his expansion (and judg­
ment) of the term set the tone for most of the criticism to 
follow: 
We may then safely define allegorical writing as 
the employment of one set of agents and images 
7 
with actions and accompaniments correspondent, so as 
to convey, while in disguise, either moral qualities 
or conceptions of the mind that are not in them­
selves objects of the senses, or other images, 
agents, actions, fortunes, and circumstances so 
that the difference is everywhere presented to the 
eye or imagination, while the likeness is suggested 
to the mind; and this connectedly, so that the 
parts combine to form a consistent whole. 5 
Three aspects of Coleridge's definition merit attention: 
first, the idea that a set of images and agents will corre­
spond to a parallel set of abstractions of the mind; secondly, 
that this correspondence will express a moral or philosophical 
value system; and finally, that all the separate parts of the 
work will "combine to form a consistent whole." 
Although Coleridge's definition of the term raises few 
problems, his judgment that symbolic writing is preferable 
to allegorical writing has given the genre of allegory more 
notoriety than it deserves.6 This judgment is based on his 
decision to value art that flows uninhibited from the uncon­
scious over art that is filtered through the mental faculties. 
8 
Many contemporary critics--Frye, Honig, and Fletcher parti­
cularly--have pointed out that Coleridge's decision is a value 
judgment based on taste rather than critical insight, but 
his opinion influenced many of his contemporaries to assume 
that allegorical writing was inferior to symbolic writing. 
This prejudice became so entrenched that the genre received 
little of its deserved treatment--causing many fine, modern 
works not to be recognized and appreciated as allegories, 
something this thesis seeks to remedy. 
One major, modern critic who has not slighted allegory 
is Northrup Frye. His brief yet lucid entry on the topic 
in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics is one 
of the best general descriptions of allegory: 
We have allegory when the events of a narrative 
obviously and continuously refer to another simul­
taneous structure of events or ideas, whether 
historical events, moral or philosophical ideas, 
or natural phenomena.7
Again, the emphasis on the double intention of allegory, the 
narrative and the ideal level, is the central point of concern 
here. When a critic of Frye's stature devotes as much of his 
thought and praise to allegory as Frye has, the door for a 
more thorough treatment of the genre is wide open: Angus 
Fletcher's seminal work Allegory: The Theory of� Symbolic 
Mode is just such a treatment, easily the most incisive and 
insightful exploration of the subject to date. 
Most critics prior to Fletcher have been content with 
providing a general, abstract definition of allegory with-
out a thorough analysis of the particular elements of the 
mode, but Fletcher moves beyond these somewhat superficial 
definitions by ferreting out the individual aspects that 
comprise allegorical literature. His analysis of the content 
of allegory provides a solid, in-depth foundation for deter­
mining if a given work can be considered an allegory. 
The Content of Allegory 
For the most part, Fletcher accepts the traditional 
definition of allegory as an extended metaphor, but he uses 
Coleridge's definition as his springboard, devoting a sepa­
rate chapter of his book to an analysis of the five elements 
9 
of allegory that Coleridge mentions: images, agents, actions, 
fortunes, and circumstances. Fletcher adds an essential 
qualifying point to the traditional definition: 
. no "pure Allegory" will ever be found. 
There is therefore no harm in drawing instances 
from borderline cases. Even The Divine Comedy, 
which most readers would assume to be the great­
est Western example of allegory, seemed to Cole­
ridge, and has more recently been shown by 
Auerbach, to be quasi-allegorical work. With such 
a major example in mind one cannot help wondering
8 if borderline cases are not going to be the norm. 
Fletcher first takes up the question of the nature of 
the agents (or characters/ in allegorical literature. He 
asserts that the major distinguishing mark of an allegorical 
agent is that it is daemonic: 
Daemons, as I shall define them, share the major 
characteristic of allegorical agents, the fact 
that they compartmentalize function. If we were 
to meet an allegorical character in real life, we 
would say of him that he was obsessed with only 
10 
one idea, or that he had an absolutely one-track 
mind, or that his life was patterned according to 
absolutely rigid habits from which he never allowed 
himself to vary.9 
The three main points here are that allegorical agents "com­
partmentalize function," that they are "obsessed with only 
one idea," and that their lives are "patterned according to 
absolutely rigid habits." 
To understand what Fletcher means by "compartmentalize 
function," we need to examine his definition of daemon, which 
is based on Schnewies' Angels and Demons. Fletcher defines 
daemon as: "Coming from the term that means to 'divide,' 
daemon impli�s an endless series of divisions of all the im­
portant aspects of the world into separate elements for study 
and control.11 10 If the daemonic agent divides his world 
into "endless divisions" and treats the events in his world 
accordingly, then his function as an agent will be compart­
mentalized in the sense that his goal will be segmented into 
some type of hierarchy: the "endless divisions" and stages 
in Dante's spiritual journey are the most obvious examples. 
Portraying the allegorical agent as being obsessed with 
a single idea is a necessary component of allegory if the 
author is to represent an abstract principle through his 
character, which is one of the main intentions of allegory. 
The author of an allegory is usually concerned with making 
one moral or philosophical point, and his main character will 
11 
share that same concern: Dante's concern with �the state of 
souls after death," Spenser's intention of fashioning a "gen­
tleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline," 
Melville's "overwhelming idea of the whale," Nietzsche's 
"overman," and Kafka's "urgent wish . . to get my business 
with the authorities properly settled" are all excellent 
examples of this daemonic obsession with a single idea. One 
quality of the ideals that obsess allegorical agents is that 
they all have an "impossible desire to become one with an 
image of unchanging purity.11
11 
Whether it is Dante's Para­
diso, Spenser's Court of Gloriana, Nietzsche's Day of the 
Overman, or Kafka's Distant Castle, the agents are all 
striving for an ideal that is outside of their grasp in this 
life. 
Fletcher contends that when a person is obsessed by an 
abstract ideal it will be expressed in ritualistic behavior, 
characterized by a life ruled by "rigid habits." These 
rituals and habits vary according to the constraints of the 
ideal, but they all have the same effect: 
- -
"it would seem 
that he Lthe character_! was driven by some hidden, private 
force . 
destiny . 
. it would appear that he did not control his own 
.,12 Because the agent is ruled by an ideal, 
his actions will be determined by his attitude towards the 
rules of the ritual, so his behavior will seem somewhat me­
chanical: Dante's actions are prescribed by the hierarchy 
of his journey; Spenser's knights are controlled by Provi­
dence; Kafka's "K." is bound by the regulations of the Castle; 
12 
and the repetitive, ritualistic plague treatments and checks 
in Camus' The Plague are all situations and circumstances when 
the agent is compelled to express his reaction towards the 
ideal through ritualistic and mechanistic actions. 
Because the allegorical agent compartmentalizes function, 
is obsessed with one idea, and is controlled by rigid habits, 
he will appear to be a "flat" or "two-dimensional" figure, 
more of a caricature than a "real," fully developed character. 
Furthermore, Fletcher asserts that· "agency becomes confused 
with imagery, and action becomes a diagram 11 j
13 
therefore, the
imagery that an author surrounds his agents with will be in­
dicative of both the nature of the character and the nature 
of the ideal in an allegorical work. 
Fletcher bases his description of allegorical imagery 
on the Greek conception of Kosmos; he argues that "Kosmos 
has a double meaning, since it denotes both a large-scale 
order (macrocosmos; and the small-scale sign of that order 
(microcosmos) .11
14 
This double function of the cosmic image
is perfectly suited for allegory since the essence of the 
mode is the parallel development of the ideal (macrocosmic 
leve 1) and the narrative (microcosmic leve 1) • 
For an image to be considered an example of Kosmos, ac­
cording to Fletcher, it must exhibit the following character-
istics: 
First, it must imply a systematic part-whole re­
lationship; second, it should be capable of in­
cluding "personifications'.;.,-; fourth, it should 
suggest the daemonic nature of the image; fifth, 
13 
it should allow an emphasis on the visual modality, 
specifically on visual or symbolic "isolation," 
not to say surrealism; finally, it should be such 
that large-scale double meanings would emerge if 
it were combined with other such images.15
Since the third and fourth characteristics have been examined, 
the first, second, fifth, and sixth are the most important 
elements to be considered regarding the nature of cosmic, 
allegorical imagery. 
If the cosmic image includes both the microcosm and the 
macrocosm, then Fletcher�s first two characteristics-- that 
it imply a part-whole relationship and that it be capable of 
metonymy and synecdoche--will naturally appear in allegorical 
imagery. Since the cosmic image must serve the double function 
of referring_simultaneously to both levels of meaning, there 
must be a "symbiosis of part and whole . • • .  The whole may 
de termine the sense of the parts, and the parts be governed 
by the intention of the whole": 16 This relationship is known
as synecdoche. "Behold, the steers/ Bring back the plough 
suspended from the yoke," is the example Quintilian gives of 
1 7 
synecdoche. Metonymy. which occurs when one word is sub-
stituted for another bearing a close relationship, is very 
common in allegory because of the necessity of equating the 
symbol with that which it symbolizes. Perhaps the most ob­
vious example of this is the naming of allegorical characters: 
Spenser 's "Red Crosse Knight," Nietzsche's "Zarathustra," and 
even Kafka's "K." are examples of metonymic substitution. 
The key term in Fletcher's fifth characteristic of an 
allegorical image is "isolation." Visually, allegories will
"present bits and pieces of allegorical 'machinery,' scales 
of justice, magic mirrors, crystal balls . . These devices 
are places on the picture plane without any clear location 
in depth. 11
18 
Fletcher distinguishes between three types of 
14 
cosmic, isolated images: the first is the talisman, which is 
a source of power or magic for the agent (Zarathustra's eagle 
and serpent); the second is the insignia or banner (Red Crosse 
Knight's red cross); and the third is astral symbolism ("It 
is the stars, / The stars above us, govern our conditions 11
19
).
If the cosmic image is isolated from normal situations 
and contexts, then it is essentially a non-mimetic mode of 
expression, ieading the reader to treat the work in an ab­
stract, interpretive manner which results in Fletcher's final 
characteristic of cosmic imagery: the emergence of large-
scale double meanings. These large-scale, macrocosmic mean­
ings--conveyed through the cosmic image--are the moral, 
ethical, and philosophical ideals that constitute the content 
of allegorical literature, and they also provide the reader 
with insight concerning the author's intention and purpose 
in writing allegories. 
The Intention of Allegory 
Why write an allegory? Keeping in mind that allegory 
is admittedly non-mimetic and Coleridge's judgment that 
allegory is inferior to pure symbolism, why would an author 
15 
choose this ambivalently received mode to express his art? 
Fletcher argues that "The price of a lack of mim tic natural­
ness is what the allegorist • . .  must pay in order to force 
his reader into an analytical frame of mind.11
20 
If this is 
correct, then the purpose of the daemonic agent and the iso­
lated cosmic image is to cause an intellectual, interpretive 
response in the reader, bringing us back to Coleridge's 
"disjunction of the faculties." Coleridge declared allegory 
inferior because he disliked this disjunction; to others, it 
is one of the most appealing aspects of literature: it all 
boils down to a matter of taste. Fletcher takes both points 
of view into account in his final appraisal of the purpose 
and intention of allegory: 
In a word, I suspect they are the monuments to our 
ideals. They do not mimetically show us the human 
beings who need these ideals, but they examine the 
philosophic, theological, or moral premises on 
which we act, and then they confront us with the 
perfection of certain ideals, the depravity of 
others.2 1 
Since the author seeks to "force his reader into an 
analytical frame of mind," then his pimary intention would 
be, as Fletcher said, to "examine the philosophic, theological, 
or moral premises on which we act," leaving the narrative 
or plot level as secondary in intention. Even though the 
best allegories can be appreciated solely for the ornamental 
beauty of their narrative level, the primary intention of 
the author is to present a system of ideals, which reveals 
16 
itself in the use of the daemonic agent and the isolated cos­
mic image. 
The allegorical agent and image act as catalysts, forcing 
the reader into "an analytical frame of mind." The allegorist 
will then "confront us with the perfection of certain ideals, 
the depravity of others." Fletcher's statement clearly places 
allegory in the category of epideictic rhetoric, which is 
rhetoric in either praise or blame of something; therefore, we 
can expand the scope of the intention of allegory to include 
both the didactic and persuasive functions. If the primary 
intention of allegory is to present a system of ideals and 
values, then the author would naturally use a didactic tone. 
Allegories are persuasive because they "raise questions of 
value directly, by asserting certain propositions as good 
and others as bad,11 22 and the author intends for us to accept
his system. These systems are traditionally dualistic in 
essence, so the author uses the tensions between good and 
evil, heaven and hell, health and sickness (among others) as 
persuasive tools to convince us to embrace his particular 
hierarchy of ideals and values. 
Edwin Honig-·in his excellent book on the genesis of 
allegory, Dark Conceit- captures the essence of the intention 
of allegory when he states that the allegorist "attempts to 
f • d 1 h t d f • I h • h t 
• t • 11
23 
rame an 1 ea t a e ines an age s 1g es aspira ions. 
The focus of this thesis is on the primary intention of alle­
gory, which is to express, through literary expertise, the 
inherent value system of a given age. By studying the value 
systems of a culture, we begin to discover the diverse and 
manifold ways man seeks to explain the labyrinth to himself. 
The next chapter compares two different and opposing value 
systems--the traditional "Christian" system and the modern 
"Existential" system--by exploring the expressed ideals in 
Spenser's The Faerie Queene and Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zara­
thustra which give meaning to the aspirations of the people 
and society they represent. Zarathustra's words set the 
stage: "Through esteeming alone is there value: and with-
out esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow.11
24 
Through allegory, we can make a "pleasing analysis" of what 
man esteems. Through allegory, we can feel the value-pulse 
of culture. 
CHAPTER II 
ALLEGORY AND VALUE IN 
SPENSER AND NIETZSCHE 
-- Once one /2a�d God when one ioo�ed upon 
d�/2tant /2ea/2; but now I have taught you 
to /2ay: ovekman. God �-0 a conjectuke, 
but I de-0�ke that youk conjectu�e/2 �hould 




Allegory in "The Faerie Queene" 
Edmund Spenser laid to rest any serious debate concern­
ing the allegorical nature of The Faerie Queene by explicitly 
stating in his prefatory letter to Raleigh that the poem is 
"a continued Allegory, or darke conceit." Still, it is im­
portant to analyze The Faerie Queene according to the defini­
tion of Chapter One to establish a solid foundation for com­
paring and contrasting the other allegories in this thesis. 
Spenser also leaves no doubt that his primary intention 
is to "examine the philosophic, theological, or moral premises 
on which we act." In the same letter to Raleigh, Spenser 
states: 
The generall end therefore of all the booke is to 
fasion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous 
and gentle disipline: . . perfected in the twelve 
private morall vertues, as Aristotle hath devised, 
the which is the purpose of these first twelve 
bookes.25 
This letter also indicates that Spenser's main charac­
ters are daemonic because they represent and are obsessed with 
one idea. Spenser makes it clear that he means the Queene to 
represent both glory and Elizabeth, that Arthur represents 
magnificence (which is all twelve virtues combined), that 
Redcrosse represents holiness, Guyon temperance, and Brito­
martis chastity. He also sets up daemonic foil characters 
which represent the evil opposition of his heroes: Redcrosse 
battles with Archimago and Duessa, Guyon with Mammon and 
20 
Acrasia, and Britomartis with Argante and Ollyphant. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, when characters 
are daemonic, they tend to be flat or two-dimensional, causing 
them to appear as nearly static images--cosmic images. Spen­
ser's characters and images fit Fletcher's six-fold defini­
tion of cosmic imagery; the first four points are fulfilled 
by the ability of the agents and images to function on the 
two levels necessary for allegory. 
Fletcher's fifth characteristic of the cosmic image is 
that it is "isolated." Spenser uses the device of the talis­
man with most of his major agents: Redcrosse has his armour 
and Guyon has his Palmer. The best example of the insignia 
or banner as a cosmic image is the red cross of the Redcrosse 
Knight; the magical power of his cross saves him more than 
once in The Faerie Queene. Spenser also relies heavily on 
astral symbolism, the third characteristic of an isolated 
image, throughout his poem so that his characters can "read 
aright/ The course of heavenly cause. 11 26 
The sixth characteristic of a cosmic image, that it 
''should be such that large-scale double meanings would emerge," 
leads back to the central distinction of all allegories: they 
function on both the ideal and narrative level simultaneously, 
and Spenser's poem easily fits this and all the other charac­
teristics of allegorical literature. 
With the issue of the allegorical nature of The Faerie 
Queene settled, we can now explore the expressed ideals of 
the Christian value system in Spenser's poem. 
21 
Spenser and the Christian Value System 
As Edmund Spenser wrote The Faerie Queene, the sixteenth 
century came to its close and the Christian value system 
reached its apex. Spenser fused the essentially Christian 
values of the renaissance and the reformation together in 
his allegorical masterpiece by combining the renaissance image 
of the courtly gentleman with the reformation doctrines of 
John Calvin. In doing this, he defined his "age's highest 
aspirations." Spenser's value system in The Faerie Queene 
revolves around three main axioms of Judeo/Christian thought: 
1) There exists a God--omnipotent, providential,
teleological--who assigns an external, extrinsic 
value to all things; an entity has value by virtue 
of its relation to this deity and its chosen, pre-
destined course. 
2) If value is determined by God, then actions
which adhere to God's design are GOOD; actions 
which oppose this design are EVIL: dualism is 
the essential nature of reality in the Christian 
world view. 
3 1 Man's course is then set for him: to choose 
either good or evil, to say either yes or no. 
Man's purpose, his meaning, is to live in the 
present in a way which will insure his fate in 
the future, which is the "other world," which is 
of more value than the "present, apparent world." 
There exists a God: this presupposition is the founda­
tion of all Judeo/Christian thought. All subsequent premises 
of this system flow directly from it: 
Well did Antiquitie a God thee deeme, 
That over mortall minds hast so great might, 
To order them as best to thee doth seeme, 
And all their actions to direct aright; 
The fatall purpose of divine foresight, 
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Thou doest effect in destined descents, 
Through deepe impression of thy secret might, 
Which the late world adrnyres for wonderous moniment.27
Spenser asserts that God possesses great and secret might 
(omnipotence) through which he inspires and directs man to 
high intents, consisting of doing God's will and God's will
alone. With this omnipotence, God designs his predetermined 
plan for his.creation, which is "The fatall purpose of divine 
foresight." Since Spenser wrote within the Calvinistic frame­
work of predestination and determinism, it is natural that he 
would portray God as the director and instigator of all men's 
actions. 
Since God is doing the planning, he necessarily assigns 
value to all entities within his system "as best to thee doth 
seeme." If value is assigned from a source outside and ex­
ternal to the entity--from outside the labyrinth--then it is 
an extrinsic value system rather than an intrinsic system, 
which is one of the main qualities of the existential value 
system. In an intrinsic system an entity has value in and of 
itself instead of receiving its value from outside of itself. 
If value is assigned extrinsically, then entities within 
the system, in the case of The Faerie Queene, derive their 
value by virtue of their relation to the value judgments of 
the assigner, God. The renaissance Christianity of Spenser 
illustrates how his culture perceived God's value judgments 
in relation to themselves and the world around them. When 
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Arthur says "Fu 11 hard it is . . to read aright / The course 
of heavenly cause, or understand/ The secret meaning of th' 
eternal might/ That rules mens ways, and rules the thoughts 
of living wight, 11 28 spenser gives his quintessential evalua­
tion of man's situation in his culture: to read from the 
heavens the value judgments of God that rule men's ways and, 
then, adhere to them. His sole task is to accept or reject 
the value judgments of God, not to choose his own values but 
to say yes or no to the values chosen for him. 
This tension between the yes and the no produces the 
dualism of good and evil which is at the heart of Christi­
anity. With this neatly divided dualism, man's course is 
clearly defined for him, so Spenser can send his Redcrosse 
Knight forth: 
Upon a great adventure he was bond, 
That greatest Gloriana to him g�ve, 
That greatest Glorious Queene of Faerie lond, 
To win him worship, and her grave to have, 
Which of all earthly things he most did crave; 
And ever as he rode his heart did earne 
To prove his puissance in battell brave 
Upon his foe and his new force to learn; 
Upon his foe, a Dragon horrible and stearne.29 
The dualism is now set: Gloriana represents the good, godly 
way, and the Dragon represents the evil, satanic way. Based 
on this dualism of good and evil, an intricate hierarchy of 
ethical values arises from the interplay of the opposing 
forces: God and Satan, heaven and hell, heaven and earth, 
law and lawlessness, spirit and flesh, soul and body, reason 
and instinct, reason and passion, sobriety and excess. 
The dualistic tension between heaven and hell acts as 
a prod for the Christian value system because the hope of re­
ward in heaven and the fear of punishment in hell motivate 
the actions of the adherents of Spenser's Christianity. The 
fifth Bead-man in Spenser's House of Holinesse attends to 
those on the verge of death, facing either heaven or hell: 
For them most needeth comfort in the end, 
When sin, and hell, and death do most dismay 
The feeble soule departing hence away, 
All is but los, that living we bestow, 
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If not well ended at our dying day. 
0 man have mind of that last bitter throw, . 30 
The implication of this statement is clear: man is to live 
in the present so that on his dying day he will receive eter­
nal reward rather than eternal punishment. If the present is 
sacrificed for the future, then the future must be of more 
value than the present. Spenser's "saint,'' then, concentrates 
his energy and value on getting out of this life for the same 
reason Icarus cone ntrates his energy and value on getting 
out of the labyrinth: they both value something beyond their 
particular labyrinth more than the labyrinth itself. Again, 
the value of an action in this system has extrinsic value 
because its value is determined not by the action in itself 
but by a future, external evaluation by God at the moment of 
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death. Since this decision of God's is eternally binding, it 
would be wise for man to sacrifice immediate, temporal con­
cerns for future, eternal concerns. The Christian hierarchy 
of value stems from this tension between the here and the 
hereafter; therefore, the goal in Spenser's value system is 
to become what you will be, which, as we will soon see, is 
the opposite of Nietzsche's goal to "become what you are! 1131 
If heaven is the ultimate goal in Spenser's Christi-
anity, then what type of ethics and values will his charac-
ters strive for and exhibit in their earthly life so they can 
achieve this goal? The most important virtue would certainly 
be obedience to the laws of God, and the Redcrosse Knight 
realizes the importance of this when, in the House of Holinesse, 
Fidelia "taught celestiall discipline, / And opened his dull 
eyes, that light mote in them shine.113 2 If a man sticks to
the "Narrow path" and avoids "the wandering wood, this 
33 Errours den," he will enter heaven in glory. 
Again, the spiritual realm is of more value than the 
physical realm in Spenser's system, so another Christian 
value would be to emphasize man's spirit over his fleshly 
body. Not only does Christianity give priority to the spirit, 
but it places the blame for most deviations from the "narrow 
path" directly on the sinful nature of the body. When Red­
crosse goes to the House of Holinesse to be healed, "sad 
Repentance'' bathes "His bodie in salt water smarting sore, / 
The filthy blots of sinne to wash away.1134 To enter heaven,
Man must bridle the sinful desires of his body, controlling 
his immediate, earthly passions by the grace of God and the 
use of his reason. 
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The powers or reason were of great importance to the 
renaissance culture in which Spenser lived, and he asserts 
throughout The Faerie Queene that reason is the means to over-
ride the desires of the sinful body: "Flesh may empaire, 
. but reason can repaire. 11 35 Man's reason, according to 
Spenser, will lead him away from excess and towards modera­
tion in all things earthly, an idea directly related to 
Aristotle's golden mean. Spenser uses the whole of Book II 
of his work and the allegorical agent of Sir Guyon to illus­
trate this value, which he calls temperance. Guyon's com­
panion is the Palmer, who represents the controlling power 
of reason: 
Then Guyon forward gan his voyage make, 
With his blacke Palmer, that him guided still. 
Still he him guided over dale and hill, 
And with his steedie staff did point his way: 
His race with reason, and with words his will,
From foule intemperance he oft did stay, 
And suffred not in wrath his hastie steps to stray.36 
So the basic character of an adherent of Spenser's Christian 
value system would be sober, grave, obedient, heavenly minded 
and temperant; he would always disregard the instincts and 
passion of his fleshly body to gain his spiritual goal of 
eternal reward in the after life. 
This Christian value system of Spenser's The Faerie 
Queene was the dominant theological and sociological system 
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throughout the renaissance and reformation, and it is still 
one of the most influential ethical value systems today. But 
an antithetical value system began to arise, fostered by the 
new discoveries of science. Friedrich Nietzsche was one of 
the first men to recognize this shift in values, and his 
philosophical allegory Thus Spoke Zarathustra is his most 
complete and influential formulation of the new "Existential" 
value system. 
Allegory in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Is Thus Spoke Zarathustra an allegory? Since Friedrich 
Nietzsche is known primarily as a philosopher and since Zara­
thustra is clearly a narrative work, it easily falls within 
Frye's statement that "We have allegory when the events of a 
narrative obviously and continuously refer to another simul-
taneous structure of events or ideas, II Nietzsche's 
primary intention was a revaluation of all values in light 
of the death of God, and he used the narrative line in Zara­
thustra to convey this central concern. 
The principal character in Nietzsche's allegory is, of 
course, Zarathustra, and he is an excellent example of a 
daemonic agent because he represents and is obse$sed with a 
single idea: "I have the overman at heart, that is my first 
and only concern . .. 3 7 Nietzsche's choice of Zarathustra 
as his central symbol was intentionally ironic: the original 
Zarathustra, or Zoraster, was a Persian prophet in the sixth 
• 
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century B.C. who was one of the first truly dualistic thinkers, 
influencing both Greek and Christian thought. The irony of 
Nietzsche's choice lies in the fact that his Zarathustra 
sought to overthrow this dualistic thinking and replace it 
with a monism revolving around the "will to power" and its 
expression by the overman. Nietzsche also ironically sets 
up his Zarathustra as a type of Christ with his many biblical 
allusions, especially in "The Last Supper" section in part 
four. The characters that surround Zarathustra at this sup­
per represent single aspects of Nietzsche's vision of the 
nature of the overman, making t�em daemonic also: the leech 
is the "conscientious in spirit," the ugliest man is the 
murderer of God, etc. 
Nietzsche's agents and images also fit the description 
of cosmic imagery because they function on both the narrative 
and ideal level that is essential for allegory. The main 
characteristic of the cosmic image--its "isolated nature"-­
is seen throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, with Nietzsche 
providing his protagonist with two central talismans: 
An eagle soared through the sky in wide circles, 
and on him there hung a serpent, not like prey 
but like a friend: for she kept herself wound 
around his neck. 
"These are my animals," 
and was happy in his heart. 
under the sun and the wisest 
sun-- • 11 38
said Zarathustra 
"The proudest animal 
animal under the 
The eagle is a positive talisman, signifying Zarathustra's 
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desire to soar above the values of his culture, but by 
choosing the serpent as an insignia and talisman for his hero, 
Nietzsche shows his opposition to the Judeo/Christian system 
where the serpent is associated with Satan and evil. Nietz­
sche also reverses the use of astral symbolism: Spenser 
wanted man to look to the stars and heavens for his "heavenly 
cause" and value, but Zarathustra loves "those who do not first 
seek behind the stars for a reason to go under and be a sacri-
fice, ,,39 Instead, he uses the sun, which gives the 
earth its life and energy, as his central astral symbol: "You 
great star, what would your happiness be had you not those 
for whom you shine? 1140 
Yes,_ Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra clearly fits
the definition of allegory in Chapter One, but what type of 
values does Nietzsche advocate through Zarathustra, and why 
are they opposed to Spenser's Christian value system? 
Nietzsche and the Existential Value System 
As Nietzsche wrote Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the ideas of 
Darwin were just taking hold, and the Christian value system 
was at low tide. Nietzsche, writing some twenty years after 
the publication of The Origin of the Species, wa� one of the 
first men, if not the first, to sense the full impact of 
Darwin's theory on the theological, psychological, and socio­
logical values of his culture. Since Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
is a herald of the decay of an "age's highest aspirations," 
Nietzsche's intent is to diagnose that decay and provide a 
remedy: he must redefine and revaluate his "age's highest 
aspirations�" 
In 1883 Nietzsche wrote what serves as a preface to 
Zarathustra; entitled "The Madman," this parable contains 
the central axiom of Nietzsche's value system: 
. "Whither is God" he cried. "I shall tell 
you. We have killed him -you and I. All of us 
are his murderers. But how have we done this? 
How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave 
us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? 
What did we do when we unchained this earth from 
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its sun? . . Do we not hear anything yet of the 
noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do 
we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? 
Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains 
dead. 11 41
God is dead: with this proclamation, Nietzsche eliminates 
the foundational premise of all Judeo/Christian thought, 
chopping off the vital root of a value system such as Spen­
ser's. Just as Spenser takes God's existence as axiomatic, 
so Nietzsche takes God's death as axiomatic. Neither writer 
attempts to prove his position because neither writer is con-
cerned with metaphysics: they are bo,th concerned with how 
to live their lives in light of these axioms. 
Another important axiom in Nietzsche's system is the 
idea that man originally created God to give his values an 
eternal, absolute reference point. Zarathustra tells of his 
own belief in God, but he soon realized that "this god whom 
I created was man-made and madness, like all gods! Man he 
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was, • out of my own ashes and fire this ghost came to 
me and, verily, it did not come to me from beyond.11 42 Once
created, man used this focal point to define the particulars 
of his world, rendering value for them according to the dic­
tates of his God. But as man came to understand the partic-· 
ulars, he began to reason back to the general premises, and 
science was born. Soon, just as Zeus destroyed Cronos, science 
began to destroy its progenator and reference point: God. 
The first major step in this parracide was, in the words of 
the Madman, to unchain this earth from its sun, a step taken 
by Copernicus and Galileo. The second major step was taken 
by Darwin with his theory of evolution: by placing the burden 
of creation directly on the organism (the earth) itself, the 
idea of a creator was no longer necessary. 
Since man created both the reference point (God) and 
the destroyer of it (science), man is then the cause of the 
destruction of his own value system, or as the Madman would 
put it: "We have killed him--you and I." If God is now 
dead, man must face his world--his labyrinth--without the help 
of the providential, guiding hand of God. Without this teleo­
logical reference point, man can no longer hope for his values 
to be given approval from a source outside of himself. With­
out God, there is not an external assigner of value, so value 
must come from man himself. Now man's judgment becomes the 
assigner of value, and we are led back to Zarathustra's state­
ment that "through esteeming alone is there value." 
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Now that man and his judgment are the center of his value 
system instead of an omnipotent God, and since man is now 
responsible for determining his own value, his psychological 
attitude and opinion of himself is crucial in this search for 
new values. Zarathustra clearly states his opinion of man, 
which is the essential starting point for his value system: 
Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman--a 
rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous 
on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous 
shuddering and stopping. What is great in man is 
that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be 
loved !n man is that he is an overture and a going 
under. 3 
"I love man" proclaims Zarathustra, and the basis for this 
love is the potential of man to move beyond himself towards 
a higher state of being--the overman. Now, instead of man's 
meaning being determined by God and the hope of reward and 
the threat of punishment in the after-life, his meaning re-
sides in himself and his desire to overcome himself: "I will 
teach men the meaning of their existence--the overman. 11
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Nietzsche's conception of the overman is probably one 
of the most misunderstood philosophical ideas in western 
thought, due mostly to two reasons. First, many English speak­
ing scholars and writers translate the German word that Nietz­
sche uses, "Ubermensche," as "superman," complete with all the 
connotations of a power-mad super-being willing to trample on 
his fellow man in quest of domination. Much of this connota­
tive meaning stems from the second reason this term is mis-
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understood. Nietzsche's idea of the overman was unfortunately 
and erroneously associated with Hitler and the Nazi movement 
because his sister, who obtained the rights to his work after 
he went insane, used excerpts of his writing out of context 
to support a proto-Nazi group led by her husband. The fact 
that Nietzsche detested any type of nationalism in general 
and his sister's ideas in particular has been thoroughly and 
painstakingly treated by Walter Kaufmann in his definitive, 
critical biography of Nietzsche's. life and work.
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What then does Nietzsche mean by overman? The most 
complete picture of the nature of the overman is in Zara­
thustra's speech "On Those Who Are Sublime": 
He should act like a bull, and his happiness should 
smell of the earth, and not contempt for the earth 
• . . Though I love the bull's neck on him, I also
want to see the eyes of the angel • . . To stand
with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will: that
is most difficult for all of you who are sublime.
When power becomes gracious and descends into the
visible--such descent I call beauty. And there is
nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you
who are powerful: let your kindness be your final
self-conquest. Of all evil I deem you capable:
therefore I want the good from you. 46 
Nietzsche's overman is a combination of a bull and an angel, 
power and kindness, power and beauty. In him, all the dual­
istic opposites of a system such as Spenser's are united. 
Nietzsche's overman seeks to overcome himself by fusing to­
gether good and evil (thesis and antithesis), creating a 
higher nature for himself and a higher truth (synthesis): 
"Everything that the good call evil must come together so 
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that one truth may be born. 11 47 Before discussing what the
nature of this monism is, it is essential to explore what 
impowers the overman to achieve this goal. 
In a Christian value system like Spenser's, man received 
the impetus to achieve his meaning and goal from outside the 
labyrinth--the will of God--but now that man is the source of 
his own values, he must look within himself for this impetus, 
finding it in the "ego . . this creating, willing, valuing 
ego, which is the measure and value of things. 11
48 Zarathus­
trd teaches that man's ego and its catalyst, the will1are the 
source of man's value and his meaning. Man's will �etermines 
what is valuable because it has the power to esteem certain 
events and entities as better than others, and "to esteem is 
to create. 11
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Since man created God via his will for an eternal refer­
ence point for his values and now that he has killed this 
God via his own will, he must revaluate his entire value system 
based on his creative ego. He must learn to affirm with his 
whole being a new pride in his creative ability: 
A new pride my ego taught me, and this I teach 
men: no longer to bury one's head in the sand of 
heavenly things, but to bear it freely, an earthly 
head, which creates a meaning for the earth. SO 
With this new sense of pride in his creative ego, man has the 
impetus to create and achieve his goal--a new meaning for the 
earth. 
In this creating, willing ego Nietzsche found the essen-
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tial force of the universe which became the ultimate ground 
of his monism: the will to power. He discovered this by 
observing the value judgments of man and concluded that man, 
through these judgments, created good and evil by his creative 
will: 
Zarathustra found no greater power on earth than 
good and evil. . A tablet of the good hangs 
over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of 
their overcomin1s; behold, it is the voice of theirwill to power.5 
Many critics treat Nietzsche's idea of the will to power in 
the same way as the overman: they interpret this drive for 
power as a desire to dominate others. But the key to a cor­
rect understanding of this concept is again in the term "over­
come.'' The �ill to power is the means for man to overcome 
himself not his fellow man: "Will--that is the name of the 
liberator and joy bringer.11 52 Nietzsche contends that man,
through his will to power, created good and evil, heaven and 
hell, and all the other opposing forces of a dualistic world 
view like Spenser's. Since the interplay between these oppo­
sites was the source of meaning for man and the earth, it is 
the task of the overman to create a new meaning for the earth 
now that the old dualism has been resolved into a monism of 
the will to power. 
Without the dualistic tension between heaven and hell, 
God and the devil, man must find his value and goal in some­
thing other than the after-life. Zarathustra might just as 
well have been speaking to Spenser when he said, "By my 
honor, friend, • all that of which you speak does not 
exist: there is no devil and hell. Your soul will be dead 
before your body: fear nothing further."
53 This passage
signals one of the most important differences between Spen-
ser's value system and Nietzsche's: instead of man seeking 
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his value and meaning in heaven and the after-life� he must 
now turn to the earth and his present, temporal life for his 
value and meaning; he must seek his value in the labyrinth 
itself: 
. remain faithful to the earth, and do not 
believe those who speak to you of otherworldly 
hopes! • •  Once the sin against God was the 
greatest sin, but God died, • To sin against
the earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to 
esteem the entrails of the unknowable higher than 
the meaning of the earth. 54 
Spenser's value system is based on what man will be and what 
reality will be in the future; Nietzsche's value system is 
based on what man is and what reality is now, in the present: 
Nietzsche's is an ''existentialist" value system because it re­
volves around what man is and how he exists in the present. 
Zarathustra's supreme ethical demand reflects the difference 
clearly: "Become what you are!� 
If this statement represents the ultimate goal in 
Nietzsche's system, then what type of values and ethics will
his overman strive for and exhibit in order to achieve this 
goal? Spenser's ethics are based on obedience to the dic­
tates of God, but Nietzsche's ethics are based around the 
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will to power and its ability to create new values by fusing 
together the dualistic opposites: "And whoever must be a 
creator in good and evil, verily, he must first be an annihil­
ator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the 
highest goodness: b t th. . t. ,.
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u is is crea ive. The overman must
experience both extremes of good and evil, so Spenser's value 
of temperance and the golden mean would have no place at all 
in Zarathustra's system. In The Faerie Queene excess is 
associated with evil (especially in "The Bowre of Bliss") 
while sobriety and gravity are associated with good, but in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the opposite is true: 
I would believe only in a god who could dance. 
And when I saw my devil I found him serious, thor-
·ough, profound, and solemn: it was the spirit of
gravity--through him all things fall. Not by wrath
does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill
the spirit of gravityr 56
Nietzsche uses the symbol of the dionysian dance throughout 
Zarathustra to characterize the overman as one caught in the 
rapture of excessive joy and laughter --which is one of the 
main qualities of the overman's nature. 
Since excess is a supreme value in Zarathustra's ethics 
and values, then passion must be valued more than reason 
and the body valued more than the spirit or soul� 
But the awakened and knowing say: body I am en­
tirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word 
for something about the body . • • •  An instrument 
of your body is also your little reason, my brother, 
which you call "spirit"--a little instrument and 
toy of your great reason. 57 
38 
Since there is not a heaven or a hell and only this earth, 
Zarathustra's values center on the physical, sensual reality 
rather than the spiritual, ideal reality of a value system 
such as Spenser's 
To "remain faithful to the earth " is the goal of the 
overman. Instead of turning to heaven for value, he will turn 
to the earth and embrace and affirm it in all its contrasting 
and contradicting glory, uniting these opposites by his 
creative will to power: "And this is all my creating and 
striving, that I create and carry together into One what is 
fragment and riddle and dreadful accident. 11
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The overman
will ultimately fuse the apparent dualistic opposites into 
the ''One" monistic whole which is the essential nature of 
reality according to the value system of Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra. 
Nietzsche's Overman: 
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis 
In Zarathustra's initial speech--"On the Three Metamor­
phoses"--Nietzsche provides the reader with the three stages 
he invisions man passing through on his way to becoming over-
man: "Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how 
the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the 
1. f' 11 h'ld .. 
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ion, 1na y, a c 1 . The next two chapters of this 
thesis seek to illustrate how Franz Kafka's The Castle, 
Albert Camus' The Plague, and Nikos Kazantzakis Zorba The 
Greek, each represent allegorically a character or charac-
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ters passing through one of the three stages along the path 
towards the overman: The Castle represents the "camel" stage; 
The Plague represents the "lion" stage; and Zorba The Greek 
represents the final stage in becoming an overman--the "child." 
Chapter Three analyzes the three novels in light of the cri­
teria for allegory given in Chapter One, while the fourth, 
and final, chapter explores the connection between the three 
allegories and Nietzsche's three stages of the overman. 
CHAPTER III 
ALLEGORY IN 
KAFKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS 
-- The �eakeh 6ok puke powek, which i� 
at the heakt 06 all allegokieal gue�t�, 




Allegorical Intention in 
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis 
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The majority of Franz Kafka's works easily fit the cri­
terion of double intention, moving between the narrative and 
ideal levels, set up in Chapter One. Fletcher refers to 
Kafka in conjunction with allegory over twenty times in his 
study of the genre, considering Kafka one of the best ex­
amples of a modern allegorist. But the strongest evidence 
of allegorical intention in Kafka's The Castle comes from 
Edwin Muir--one of the first to translate Kafka's work into 
English and one of the leading Kafka authorities--who pro­
vides this.synopsis of Kafka's technique in the novel: 
As pure imaginative creations K.'s scenes have 
this packed ±ullness which gives them simultane­
ously several meanings, one concealed beneath the 
other, until in a trivial or commonplace situation 
we find an image of some universal or mythical 
event such as the Fall of Man. It is in this way 
that Kafka's allegory works. He has been blamed 
for confusing two worlds; for introducing real 
people, living in real houses, . and then by 
a sudden twist making all their actions symbolical 
and bringing them into actual contact with emblem­
atical figures. The answer is that this was ob­
viously the thing he was trying to do.60
Along with pointing out the double intention in Kafka's 
The Castle, Muir singles out one of the major differences 
between an allegorist like Spenser and one like Kafka: the 
former places his agents in a mythical, romantic setting 
(Faerie Land), while the latter places his agents in a more 
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real-life situation, creating the "mixture of realism and 
allegory which is Kafka's peculiar invention. " 61
As one of the masterpieces of the twentieth century, 
Albert Camus' The Plague has been treated by critics in many 
different ways, but most recognize it as an allegory. Flet­
cher refers to Camus' novel as an allegory many times, and 
Philip Thody, one of the leading experts on Camus' work, calls 
The Plague an "allegory of the hostile nature of the absurd. 11 62 
Donald Lazere--in The Unique Creation of Albert Camus--en­
titles his chapter on The Plague "Naturalistic Allegory," 
explaining that 
In The Plague Camus audaciously synthesized the 
ultimate extension of both of the opposing tech-
n.iques into an allegorical naturalism. . Trt-1 
is an incisive . portrayal that reveals univer-
sal truths about any group of humans in crisis. 63 
The final clause of this quote shows Camus moving between the 
ideal level ("universal truths") and the narrative level 
\"group of humans"), a point Adele King reinforces: "The 
form and style of the novel exist on two levels: the level at 
which Rieux writes his 'cronicle' as objectively as possible 
and the level at which Camus creates a myth about man's 
f t  ,,64 a e. 
Like Kafka, Camus' allegory is much more realistic than 
either Spenser's or Nietzsche's, so we should look for agents 
to appear in real-life, rather than imaginary, settings and 
situations. Camus would not have gone to the trouble of 
documenting the plague so thoroughly if he did not intend 
for it to be taken realistically, yet it still functions on 
the ideal level at the same time. 
If we are to treat Zorba The Greek as an allegory, we 
must keep in mind Fletcher's statement that "no 'pure alle­
gory' will ever be found. There is therefore no harm in 
drawing instances from borderline cases." Kazantzakis' no­
vel is on the borderline primarily because his character 
Zorba is based on his real-life friend, George Zorba, so it 
will be a much more realistic example of allegory than most 
allegorical works. 
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But Zorba The Greek is truly a narrative which "obvi­
ously and continuously refeII
.,. 
s 1 to another simultaneous 
structure of events or ideas," as Frye would say. Morton 
Levitt--in his pioneering book on Kazantzakis, The Cretan 
Glance--asserts that Zorba The Greek is Kazantzakis' "most 
metaphysical work, 11 6 5 and that if we want to "find the truth
of the novel, we must look not to history but to its philo­
sophical roots. 11
66 
Still, the best evidence of Kazantzakis' 
intention to fuse together his philosophy and art is in the 
novel itself: "If only I could never open my mouth, I thought, 
until the abstract idea had reached its highest point- and 
67 had become a story!" These are the words of the narrator, 
who many critics feel represents aspects of Kazantzakis him­
self. We also learn through the narrator who Kazantzakis 
intends to embody his ideal: "my thoughts flitted around the 
most remote ideas but came back and settled on Zorba. 11
68 
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These two passages from Zorba The Greek show that Kazantza­
kis intended his novel to function on both the narrative and 
ideal level, which is the main characteristic of allegorical 
literature. 
The Daemonic Agent in 
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis 
In a traditional Christian allegory like The Faerie 
Queene, the daemonic nature of the agents stands out clearly 
because they are placed in fantastic, unrealistic settings; 
therefore, the more realistic the allegory, the less obvious 
the daemonic agents will be. Since it was Kafka's "peculiar 
invention" to mix realism and allegory, his agents will be 
subtly and realistically daemonic. Fletcher's first point 
about daemonic agents is that they "compartmentalize func­
tion," which means the procedure and goal of the agent is 
divided into a hierarchy of separate segments. The intri­
cate, bureaucratic hierarchy K.--the central agent in The 
Castle--contends with is an excellent example of comparmental­
izing function. 
Kafka's Land-Surveyor, K., fits Fletcher's second 
characteristic of a daemonic agent because he is clearly 
obsessed and motivated by a single concern: "It's my most 
urgent wish, really my only wish, to get my business with 
69 the authorities properly settled." This single-mindedness, 
according to Fletcher, causes the agent to limit his freedom, 
and action to a single goal: 
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The daemonic agent has no choice but to go and 
then stay bound on his quest, whether for learn­
ing and self-knowledge, or for holiness, or for 
simple power, or for some object he himself cannot 
define, which may be the case with Kafka's favor­
ite hero, K.70 
Even though K. is not compelled by an outside force to stay 
in the village and fight the authorities, when Frieda (K.'s 
fiancee) begs him to leave the village he replies: 
go away, I came here to stay. 71I'll stay here." 
"I can't 
When a character's life is controlled by "rigid habits," 
they are, according to Fletcher, daemonic, and Kafka's K. is 
just such a character. If he is to realize his goal of set­
tling his business with the authorities of the Castle, he 
must work within the strict rules and regulations of the 
bureaucracy he faces. Burgel, one of the few Castle officials 
K, actually speaks with, explains why the process of communi-
eating with the Castle is so "ruthless": "Actually this 
ruthlessness, when you come to think of it, is nothing but 
a rigid obedience to and execution of their duty, II 72 
Indeed, a great deal of K.'s problem in getting through to the 
authorities stems from his unwillingness , at first, to adhere 
to this rigid system of "habits." 
In many ways, Camus' The Plague is a more realistic work 
than Kafka's The Castle, so the daemonic nature of Camus' 
agents will be even more subtle than Kafka's agents. The 
plague itself is the central agent in the novel, and it obvi­
ously "compartmentalizes function" because it imposes a rigid 
hierarchy of procedures on the people of Oran which they 
46 
must follow if they are to avoid and defeat it. 
Before the plague descends on Oran, Camus portrays the 
citizens of the town as daemonic--for they are obsessed with 
a single idea: 
Our citizens work hard, but solely with the ob­
ject of getting rich. Their chief interest is in 
comm(irce, and their chief aim in life is, as they 
call it, "doing business. 11 73 
When the plague does descend on Oran, the people become ob-
sessed with another, more important, single concern: "Since 
plague became in this way some men's duty, it revealed it-
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self as what it really was; that is, the concern of all." 
Each of the main agents in the novel has a central concern 
that they must learn to adapt to situations they are put in 
by the plague: Rieux wants only to cure; Tarrou wants only 
peace of mind; Rambert wants only to see his lover again; 
and Grand wants only to hear "Hats off!" in praise of his 
novel. 
The people of Oran, both before and during the plague, 
base their lives around their own "rigid habits." Prior to 
the plague, Rieux says of his fellow citizens, 
IThel truth is that everyone is bored, and devotes 
6ims�lf to cultivating habits, . It will be 
said, no doubt, that these habits are not peculiar 
to our town; really all our contemporaries are 
much the same. 75 
During the plague, these people must change their habits from 
swimming, making love, and making money to the rigid habits 
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imposed on them by the plague: they must now center their 
lives around the ritual regulations and quarantines if they 
hope to survive the epidemic. Rieux is forced to make habits 
out of the constant diagnoses, innoculations, and lancing 
of buboes if he is to help save his fellow citizens; these 
"habits" make him a realistically daemonic agent. 
As with Kafka and Camus, the .more naturalistic the alle­
gory, the less apparent the daemonic aspects of the agent 
will be, but these aspects are still present in a very com­
plex way in Kazantzakis' central agent, Zorba. That Kazant­
zakis intended Zorba to represent a single idea--the child 
stage of Nietzsche's overman--will be more than evident when 
the connection between Nietzsche and Kazantzakis is made 
clear, so it will suffice now to say that Zorba is obsessed 
with a single idea, and, therefore, he is a daemonic agent. 
This daemonic aspect is more obvious in Kazantzakis' narra-
tor-agent, the Boss: II . I have always been consumed with 
one desire: to touch and see as much as possible of the 
earth and sea before I die . 11 76 
Again, because of the nature of the ideal, Kazantzakis 
wanted to portray in Zorba, we will not see his main char­
acter being controlled by "rigid habits." Nietzsche's child 
--like Zorba--is one who is free from and unconstrained by 
"rigid habits." But we do see this aspect of the daemonic 
agent in the character who acts as a foil to Zorba, the 
Boss: he is controlled by his habits of "chewing up" books 
and pencil-pushing. 
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When characters fit this three-fold description of the 
daemonic agent, they appear--according to Fletcher--to be 
static, two dimensional figures, causing "agency 1:to be=I 
confused with imagery." The two assistants assigned to K. 
by the Castle are an excellent example of this fusion of 
agent and image;after K. throws the assistants out of the 
school he and Frieda are employed as janitors in, they run 
to the railings of the school's garden, climbing around like 
monkeys on bars: 
There they ran to and fro holding onto the rail­
ings, then remained standing and stretched out 
their clasped hands beseechingly toward K. They 
went on like this for a long time, without think­
ing of the uselessness of their efforts; they 
were as if obsessed, . • . So as not to have to 
hold on all the time, one of them had hooked him­
s�lf onto the railings behind by the tail of his 
coat.77 
In The Plague, one of Rieux's patients--an old man with 
asthma--becomes a static image because his only activity in 
life is to transfer peas from one pan into another. Kazant­
zakis provides our final instance of the allegorical fusion 
of agent and image with his description of Zorba's "fiancee," 
Madame Hortense, who looks like 
a noble three masted frigate and all her lovers­
she had seen forty-five working years··-were 
boarding her, climbing into the holds, onto the 
gunwale, into the rigging, while she sailed 
along, . . . 78 
This type of static, constant action by allegorical agents 
makes them appear as "cosmic images," or, as Albert Camus 
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79 so aptly described Kafka's agents, as "inspired automata." 
The Cosmic Image in 
Kafka, Camus, and Kazantzakis 
In traditional Christian allegory, the cosmic image-­
especially the talisman or insignio--is a source of power 
for the agent, but Fletcher contends that "with Kafka kosmos 
becomes imbued with doubt and anxiety; hierarchy itself 
· 80 causes fear, hatred, tentative approach, tentative retreat." 
Consequently, the talismans and insignias Kafka surrounds K. 
with in The Castle should deprive him of power rather than 
provide him with it. The letters K. receives from Klamm, 
the authority in charge of his case, illustrate this use of 
the talisman. The first letter gives K. "proof'' of his iden­
tity as a Land-Surveyor; he is so impowered by this letter 
that he nails it on the wall of his room, replacing a reli-
81 gious picture that previously hung there. But this elation 
and security does not last for long, because the mayor and 
others point out that it is not an "official" letter, and it 
could even be a forger1, thus rendering it powerless in K. 's 
quest for recognition from the Castle. 
A traditional Christian allegory like The Faerie Queene 
will also employ cosmic, astral imagery to show the power 
the heavens can offer the agent, but, again, Kafka reverses 
this practice to illustrate the powerlessness of K. in his 
attempt to penetrate into the Castle. When K. realizes that 
his messenger Barnabas--K. 's only means of communication with 
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the Castle--will be unable to help him in his quest, he muses 
to himself that Barnabas "was of j ust as little help as the 
82 stars up there against the tempest down below." 
Fletcher asserts that one of the main characteristics 
of the cosmic images is its "isolation." and Camus' The Plague 
employs this "isolation" imagery to convey one of the main 
themes of the novel--portraying the effects of plague-like 
evil when it cuts off a group of people from the rest of 
humanity. Rieux describes Oran a� "humped snailwise on 
83 its plateau and shut off almost everywhere from the sea," 
and as "a lost island of the damned,11 84 which are both iso-
lated, cosmic images. 
Camus uses talismans and insignias in portraying the 
plague itself since it is such an abstract, unseen agent in 
the novel. The first sign of the plague is the rats that 
infest the town and then die of the plague. Its first victim, 
M. Michel, intuitively knows of the connection between the
rats and his disease, constantly babbling "Them rats! Them 
85 damn rats!" as death approaches. Father Paneloux provides 
the plague with another talisman in his first sermon during 
the epidemic: 
He bade his hearers picture a huge wooden bar 
whirling above the town, striking at random, 
swinging up again in a shower of drops of blood, 
and spreading carnage and suffering on earth, • .  
He uses this winnowing blade or bar in his analogy of the 
Christian explanation of why the town has been struck with 
86 
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the plague: God is using it to separate the wheat from the 
chaff, and those that die deserve it because they have sinned 
against God. Like Kafka's talismans, these cosmic images do 
not provide the agents with power, instead, they deprive them 
of both power and life. 
Camus reverses astral imagery for the same reason, to 
show that man cannot rely on the heavens for help or power: 
Thus each of us had to be content to live only for 
the day, alone under the vast indifference of the 
sky. This sense of being abandoned, which might 
in time have given characters a finer temper, 
began, however, by sapping them to the point of 
futility . . • .  they seemed at the mercy of the 
sky's caprices--in other words, suffered and hoped 
irrationally. 87 
In Zor�a The Greek, Kazantzakis provides both of his 
main characters, the Boss and Zorba, with talismans or insig­
nias. In keeping with the bookish nature of the Boss, Kazant­
zakis has him carry "a little edition of Dante--my travelling 
companion 11
88 
and write a book on the Buddha. Both of these
talismans work in the same way as Kafka's and Camus' talismans 
since they represent the ideas keeping him from becoming 
like Zorba and the idea he represents. Zorba's talisman, on 
the other hand, impowers him with the strength to be his ideal, 
functioning as Spenser's talismans do. Zorba's talisman is 
the santuri, a dulcimer-like instrument, that he bought at 
the age of twenty with the money he intended to use for his 
upcoming wedding: 
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Since I learned to play the santuri, I've been 
a different man. When I'm feeling down, or when 
I'm broke, I play the santuri and it cheers me up. 
When I'm playing, you can talk to me, I hear no­
thing and even if I hear, I can't speak, • • •  A 
passion, that's what it is! 89
Kazantzakis often uses astral imagery as metaphors that 
show the state of mind of his characters. The longer the Boss 
is with Zorba, the more he is affected by his outlook on life, 
and Kazantzakis employs astral imagery to illustrate this . 
change: 
I I-the Boss 1, for my part, stayed awake a long 
time, watching the stars travel across the sky. 
I saw the whole sky change its position--and the 
shell of my skull, like an observatory dome, 
changed position, too, together with the constel­
lations. "Watch the movement of the stars as if 
you were turning with them . • • . " This sentence 
of Marcus Aurelius filled my heart with harmony.�O 
Zorba's child-like nature, one of the most important aspects 
of the Nietzschean overman, is conveyed by Kazantzakis with 
the help of astral imagery: "Zorba looked at the sky with 
open mouth in a sort of ecstasy as though he were seeing it 
for the first time.11 9 1
All three of these modern works--The Castle, The Plague, 
and Zorba The Greek--function simultaneously on the narrative 
and the ideal level, showing the double intention so impor­
tant to this genre. Kafka and Camus extensively use both 
the daemonic agent and the cosmic image, while Kazantzakis 
employs enough aspects of the allegorical agent and image 
to be considered a borderline case of allegory until the best 
evidence for allegory in Zorba The Greek is presented--the 
connection between Kazantzakis and Nietzsche. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NIETZSCHEAN VALUES IN 
KAFKA, CAMUS, AND KAZANTZAKIS 
-- I love tho-0e who do not 6�k-0t -0eek beh�nd 
the -0tak-0 6ok a kea-0on to go undek and be a 
-0aek�6iee, but who -0aek�6�ee them-0elve-0 60� 
the eakth, and the eakth may -0ome day become 
the ovekman'-0. - -
Nietzsche's Zarathustra 
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Kafka and the Camel 
-- What �/2 d�66�cult? a/2k/2 the /2p���t 
that would beak much, and kneel/2 down 
l�ke a camel want�ng to be well loaded.
What �/2 mo/2t d�66�cult, 0 hekoe/2, a/2k/2
the /2p�k�t that would beak much, that I
may take �t upon my/2el6 and exult �n my
/2Uength? --
Nietzsche's Zarathustra 
What type of value system is Kafka trying to portray 
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in The Castle? Most critics--including Thomas Mann, Angus 
Fletcher, Albert Camus, and Walter Kaufmann--view Kafka as 
primarily a religious, theological writer, concerned pri­
marily with -the effect of religion on the values and actions 
of man. Camus calls The Castle a "theology in action," 92
and Muir points out how important religion is to Kafka and 
his work: 
We must give a contingent assent to Kafka's re­
ligion, therefore, before we can understand the 
world of his imagination . . . .  At its center 
and in its most remote minifestations, lies the 
dogma of the incommensurability of divine and 
human law which Kafka adopted from Kierkegaard. 93 
The idea that Kafka adopted from Kierkegaard comes from the 
latter's book Fear and Trembling in which he uses the story 
of the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham to illustrate the dif­
ference between divine and human law. Kierkegaard was con­
stantly concerned with the apparently unbridgeable gulf be­
tween the orders and laws of the deity and the abilities of 
man to carry out these orders and laws, which seem to con­
flict with his own moral values. 
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If this central religious idea is allegorically applied 
to The Castle, then the Castle represents the divine realm, 
the village represents the human realm, and the task of 
Kafka's protagonist is to accept the policies of the divine 
and incorporate them into his human situation. As the head 
of the Castle, Count Westwest would then represent God, and 
the workers and officials of the Castle would then represent 
the priests of God's church, acting as mediators between the 
divine and the human. 
There has been a good deal of critical debate about the 
existence of God in the theological framework of The Castle. 
Critics such as Mann and Muir assume that God exists but 
that man is unable to communicate with him. The late Walter 
Kaufmann, probably the leading authority on Existentialism, 
offers a different interpretation of The Castle's allegory: 
In the usual exegesis, Kafka's Castle stands for 
God: the hero is remote from God, while the people 
of the village are nearer to God, and the problem 
is one of divine grace. At the beginning of the 
novel, however, we are told that the Castle is the 
castle of Count Westwest, and after that the count 
no longer figures in the story. The German "west" 
means "decomposes." I suggest that in The Castle� 
God is dead, and we are faced with a world devoid 
of sense. The villagers are not close to God: 
in the words of Nietzsche's "madman" in The Gay 
Science "this tremendous event . • has not yet 
reached the ears of men. 11 94 
Although Kafka never gives much substantial "proof" for 
either the existence or death of God, Kaufmann' s interpreta-
tion seems the most probable because no one has ever seen 
the Count. When K. asks the teacher if he knows the Count, 
he replies, "No, . Why should I? . Please remember 
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that there are innocent children present.11 95 Kaufmann's point 
about the German word "west" would also seem to indicate that 
God is dead, but the most important question is what effect 
does it have on man and his human situation. Man's existen­
tial situation is the same whether God exists or not: either 
way he is unable to communicate with the deity, and he must 
face his life without it. 
I contend that Kafka, like most people, does not know 
for sure if God exists or not--but what he does know is that 
he must live in a culture where all values flow from the pre­
mise of God's existence. In The Castle K. is not very con­
cerned with whether there is really a Count Westwest or not, 
but he is obsessively concerned with getting approval from 
the Castle of his position in the village--in the labyrinth. 
K. has supposedly been contracted by the Castle to function
in the village as a Land-Surveyor; but when he arrives he is 
unexpected and unwanted: in fact, he is asked on his first 
.evening in the village to "quit the Count's territory at 
once.11 96 Without divine sanction from the Castle, K. is
an alien and a stranger in the village, and he must obtain 
this sanction before he will be accepted in the village. 
This obsessive concern with man in his temporal, human situa" 
tion is the existential element so important to Kafka's work. 
If K. is to be accepted in the village and achieve his 
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goal, he must take on the values and "rigid habits" of the 
Castle. It is in this sense that K. can be seen as an ex-
ample of the first stage, or metamorphoses, of Nietzsche's 
overman--the camel: 
Like a camel, he kneels down and lets himself be 
well loaded. Especially the strong, reverent 
spirit that would bear much: he loads too many 
alien grave words and values on himself, and then 
life seems a desert to him.97 
It is highly probable that Kafka--a man so deeply in-
fluenced by existentialism via Kierkegaard--was familiar with 
Nietzsche's idea of the overman and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
which was extremely popular in Germany during Kafka's life­
time. Walter Kaufmann is not the only critic �o compare 
Nietzsche and Kafka: Albert Camus and Eric Heller also draw 
connections between the two writers. Heller, author of The 
Disinherited Mind, writes that Nietzsche is "in many respects 
a legitimate spiritual ancestor of Kafka"; he also draws a 
comparison between Kafka and Nietzsche's overman/superman: 
If Nietzsche's Superman is the aesthetic counter­
balance to the weight of the curse, then Kafka 
is its chosen victim. What some of his critics 
interpret as signs of religious achievement in 
his later writings, is merely the all-engulfing 
weariness of a Nietzschean Prometheus, which Kafka 
expressed in the fourth of his Prometheus legends: 
"Everyone grew weary of the meaningless affair. 
The gods grew weary, the eagles grew weary, the 
wound closed wearily. 11 98 
Just as Nietzsche's camel is overcome with weariness when he 
allows himself to be loaded with the burden of alien values, 
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so Kafka's K. is overcome with weariness under the burden of 
the alien values of the Castle and its village. 
Nietzsche's camel is one who willingly allows the values 
and burdens of an alien culture to be loaded upon himself in 
order to become part of that culture. He starts out as a 
strong and reverent spirit but is soon crushed by the load of 
a value system that either will not or cannot deliver what 
it promises. K. is just such a camel. 
K.'s attitude at the beginning of the novel is one of 
a strong, self-confident man who feels he is due respect 
because of his prestigious position of Land-Surveyor that 
the Castle has supposedly given to him. When he is asked to 
"quit the Count's territory " he reacts with great assurance 
and indifference: 
"Enough of this fooling," said K. in a markedly 
quiet voice, laying himself down again and pull­
ing up the blanket. "You're going a little too 
far, my good fellow, and I'll have something to 
say tomorrow about your conduct. . Let me 
tell you that I am the Land Surveyor whom the Count 
is expecting. 11 99
After this initial encounter with the bureaucracy of the 
Castle, he feels more than up to the small challenge he ex­
pects from the authorities, and he is still under the illu­
sion that he can get what he wants in his own way. Like 
the camel, K. willingly takes on the load of alien values, 
expecting to carry them easily to his destination--the Castle. 
But K.'s self-confidence and strength start to deteri­
orate after his very first attempt to penetrate the Castle. 
On his first full day in the village, K. decides to walk to 
the Castle, meeting the teacher along the way. After their 
conversation about the Count, K. feels 
disconcerted, irritated by the conversation. 
For the first time since his arrival he felt 
really tired . . . .  He felt irresistably drawn 
to seek out new acquaintances, but each new 
acquaintance only seemed to increase his weari­
ness.l00 
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Not only is K. beginning to learn that his battle is 
going to be much harder than he thought, but he soon dis­
covers as he seeks out these "new acquaintances," that all 
the ''respectable" people in town reject him because he is not 
recognized by the Castle. In fact, the only family in the 
village who will have anything to do with K. is Barnabas'-­
his messenger--family, and they are the outcasts of the vil­
lage. Kafka uses this family primarily to show what happens 
to someone who refuses to submit to the values of the Castle. 
Amalalia, one of Barnabas' sisters, refused to sleep with 
a high ranking Castle official, Sortini, ao the entire family 
was "excommunicated" from the village. 
So if K. hopes to get through to the Castle, he must 
accept and abide by the rules of the Castle, by the rules 
of tradition. Early in the novel, the landlady tries to ex­
plain to K. why his approach will not work: 
I don't deny that it's possible once in a while 
to achieve something in the teeth of every rule 
and tradition, I've never experienced anything 
of that kind myself, but I believe there are 
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precedents for it. That may well be, but it cer­
tainly doesn't happen in the way you're trying to 
do it, simply by saying, "no, no, 11 and sticking 
to your own opinions and flouting the most well�
meant advice.101 
With each futile attempt to get his case dealt with, K. 
learns how true the landlady's advice was. At every junc­
ture in his quest, K. is blocked by either the bureaucracy 
of the Castle, petty officials, his assistants, or even his 
fiancee, Frieda. K. 's weariness and fatigue increase with 
every fruitless attempt to gain access and sanction from the 
Castle. When he is finally granted an interview with an 
official, Erlanger, he is so overcome with fatigue that he 
stumbles into the wrong room, meeting the wrong official, 
Burgel. For some unexplained reason, because he is caught 
by surprise and unprepared by K., Burgel is placed: 
. . . in a situation in which it very soon becomes 
impossible to refuse to do a favor, . . . la-I de­
fenseless position in which one sits here waiting 
for the applicant to utter his plea and knowing 
that once it is uttered one must grant it, . 102 
K. is now in the perfect position to realize his ulti­
mate goal, to be recognized and sanctioned by the Castle so 
that he will be accepted in the village: all he has to do 
is speak up. But K. is so overcome with fatigue that all he 
can do is fall asleep, missing his prime opportunity. Later, 
K. is painfully
aware that his weariness had today done him more 
harm than all the unfavorableness of circumstan­
ces, but why could he, who had believed he could 
rely on his body and who would never have 
started out on his way without that conviction, 
why could he not endure a few bad nights and 
one sleepless night, why did he become so un­
manageably tired . . • ? 103 
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Like Nietzsche's camel, K. is weary because he loaded alien 
values on himself; the weight of the values of the Castle is 
far too much for him to bear, and K. becomes a beaten, pas­
sive man following his encounter with Burgel. Although Kaf­
ka left his novel unfinished, Thomas Mann, in his "Homage" 
to The Castle, tells of the account that Kafka gave to his 
friends of the novel's ending: "K. d,ies--dies out of sheer 
exhaustion after his desperate efforts to get in touch with 
the Castle and be confirmed in his appointment." 
·K.--the camel--is finally crushed by the weight of the
alien values he loaded upon himself. Because of his desire 
for and obsession with gaining divine sanction from the 
Castle so that he will be accepted in the village as the Land­
Surveyor, he willingly burdens himself with their values, 
only to be destroyed by the value system he hoped would "save" 
him. This is what Nietzsche expects will happen to one who 
loads himself with alien--in this case, Judeo/Christian-­
values, but he sees this as a necessary stage or metamorphosis 
on the path towards the overman. The second step on this 
path is the "lion" stage, which Albert Camus personifies in 
his allegory, The Plague. 
Camus and the Lion 
-- In the lonelie-0t de-0ekt, howevek, 
the �eeond metamokpho-0i-0 oeeuk-0: heke 
the �pikit beeome-0 a lion who would 
eonquek hi-0 6�eedom and be ma-0tek in 
hi-0 own de-0ekt. Heke he -0eek-0 out hi-0 
l�-0t ma-0tek: he want-0 to 6ight him and 
h�-0 la-0t god; 6ok ultimate vietoky he 
want� to 6ight with the gkeat dkagon. -�
Nietzsche's Zarathustra 
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Camus is clearly not an advocate of a traditional Chris­
tian value system like Spenser's; Henri Peyre, in his essay 
Camus the Pagan, states that 
Camus is profoundly opposed to all Christianity 
stands for: first the notions of incarnation, of 
grace, of redemption, of repentance, and of col­
lective guilt for some sin committed, unbeknown 
to us. 1 04 
The quote in the previous chapter concerning Camus' use of 
astral imagery also indicates that Camus did not accept an 
extrinsic value system such as Christianity: man must face 
the "indifference of the sky" without the hope that something 
outside the labyrinth will give his values sanction. 
Camus' antagonism towards Christian reasoning like Pane­
loux offers in his two sermons again shows how he feels about 
Christianity and the explanations it provides. The only time 
Rieux loses his composure in The Plague is when he confronts 
Paneloux and his Christian explanation of the reason for the 
plague, which is that man deserves his suffering because he 
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is disobedient to God: "Rieux swung round on him fiercely. 
'Ah! That child, anyhow, was innocent, and you know it as 
well as I do! ,., lOS The child is M. Othon's son who has just
died from the plague. 
If Camus does not rely on Christianity for the basis of 
his value system then what does he use? Peyre cites Camus 
as one "who attempted to derive the logical consequences 
from the Nietzschean death of God.11 106 Since many critics-­
including Germaine Bree, Lev Braum, and Adele King--draw the 
connection between Camus and Nietzsche, a representative 
quote from Walter Kaufmann will suffice to confirm this con­
nection: 
. Camus's Notebooks are studded with references 
and quotations from Nietzsche, including a great 
many from Twilight of the Idols. He once jotted 
down as a chapter heading, "We Nietzscheans," 
and he was certainly very much influenced by 
Nietzsche.107 
Along with the numerous references to Nietzsche in his 
Notebooks, Camus devotes an entire chapter of his philosophi­
cal essay, The Rebel, to Nietzsche and his central axiom con­
cerning the death of God: 
With him I-Nietzsche-I rebellion begins with "God is 
dead," which is assumed as an establis.hed fact; 
. Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God. 
He found him dead in the soul of his contempo­
raries. He was the first to understand the immense 
importance of the event and to decide that this 
rebellion on the part of man could not lead to a 
renaissance unless it was controlled and directed.108
Later in the same essay Camus states, "We must be the advo-
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cates of Nietzsche," and Camus had the same desire as Nietzsche 
to direct this rebellion against the traditional value system 
by an active resistance towards Christianity and its explana­
tions. 
If we interpret the allegory of The Plague in light of 
this attitude of active rebellion against the traditional 
Christian value system, then we begin to get an idea of how 
Camus' "Rebel" should react towards the senseless "evil"--
which the plague represents--in his world, his labyrinth. 
But first, we need to examine the Christian reaction to the 
plague which Camus' rebel will react against. 
Father Paneloux personifies the Christian reaction to 
and explanation of the plague; he sets the tone for his first 
sermon during the epidemic in "emphatic tones: 'Calamity has 
come on you, my brethren, and, my brethren, you deserve it,' 
II 109 The citizens of Oran deserve the plague because
they have sinned against God. Paneloux explains that God 
sent the plague as both a punishment and as a sign of his 
"love." The plague shows God's love because it will chastize 
them in a way that will cause them to return to him: 
And thus, my brothers, at last it is revealed to 
you, the divine compassion which has ordained 
good and evil in everything; wrath and pity; the 
plague and your salvation. This same pestilence 
which is slaying you works for your good and 
points your path.110 
Camus' rebel refuses to accept this explanation; instead, he 
chooses to call evil what it is--evil--and fight the plague 
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in another way, with another explanation. 
It is in this sense that Camus' The Plague can be seen 
as exemplifying Nietzsche's ''lion" stage of the overman. 
Nietzsche says that the lion wants to fight the "great 
dragon," which does not symbolize the evil, Satanic force 
like it does in The Faerie Queene; as usual, Nietzsche re­
verses the symbolic meaning of the dragon, aiming it right 
back at the Christian value system: 
Values, thousands of years old, shine on these 
scales; and thus speaks the mightiest of all 
dragons: "All value of all things shines on me. 
All value has long been created, and I am all 
created value. 11 111 
This dragon that the lion seeks to do battle with is the 
creator of the old value system and the extrinsic reference 
point from which all traditional values stem: the Judeo­
Christian God. Camus' opposition to this type of value system 
has already been pointed out, so all that needs be done is 
see how he works this out in his allegory The Plague. 
Camus shied away from creating one central hero--one 
lion--in The Plague because he was far too realistic to ex-
pect one man to be a total hero or overman. I contend that 
Camus uses four principal agents in his novel to personify 
the lion hero: Grand, Rambert, Tarrou, and Rieux. Each of 
these men embody different attributes of the hero that seeks 
a solution other than the Christian explanation for dealing 
with the plague and what it represents, so a brief look at 
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each of these characters will produce a composite sketch of 
the second stage of Nietzsche's overman--the lion. 
Joseph Grand--the man obsessed with writing the perfect 
novel who never gets past the first sentence--is signified 
by Rieux as the "hero" of his narrative because he "had to 
his credit only a little goodness of heart and a seemingly 
absurd ideal.11
1 12
Why would Rieux pick a "man of about fifty 
years of age, tall and drooping, with narrow shoulders, thin 
limbs, and a yellowish mustache" as his lion hero?
113 
Pre­
cisely because Grand is one of the few human beings that has 
his values and desires centered around this life and man 
instead of an abstract ideal. Through Rieux, Camus makes 
his admiration for this type of man evident: 
Rieux was thinking it was only right that those 
whose desires are limited to man and his humble 
yet formidable love should enter, if only now and 
then, into their reward.114 
Camus also shows his respect for men like Grand by 
making him the first to recover fully from the Plague, leav­
ing Rieux "Completely baffled by this 'resurrection.111
115
The final scene with Grand in the novel is when he says good­
bye to Rieux, and tells him that he made a "fresh start" on 
the first sentence of his novel: "'I've cut out all the 
adjectives.' And, with a twinkle in his eye, he took his 
hat off, bringing it low in a courtly sweep.11
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Raymond Rambert--the visiting journalist who is trapped 
in Oran by the plague--is in many ways the opposite of Grand: 
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he is "short, square shouldered, with a determined-looking 
face and keen, intelligent eyes, He is also able 
to come straight to the point whenever he has something to 
say, which is quite different from Grand's inability to find 
his words. 
His only desire is to escape plague-stricken Oran and 
return to Paris and the woman he deeply loves. At first he 
is unable to escape Oran, but when he finally succeeds in 
making arrangements to escape, he realizes he belongs in Oran 
fighting the plague. When he tells Rieux of his decision to 
stay and do battle with the plague, Rieux replies that "there 
was nothing shameful in preferring happiness." Although 
Rambert agrees he feels that "it might be shameful to be 
. 
118 happy by oneself." This attitude is exactly what makes 
Rambert one of Camus' lion heroes: he, like Grand, has his 
values in this world, especially in his love for his fiancee, 
but he knows that this love would never be fulfilling or com­
plete if he left his fellow-man in a state of suffering 
Also like Grand, Rambert is allowed to enter into his reward 
when he is reunited with his fiancee after the plague finishes 
with the town. 
Jean Tarrou is another visitor to the town of Oran, 
and it is through his actions and his diary that we see a 
third aspect of Camus' lion hero. Rieux describes him as 
looking "like a big grey bear,11 119 and his only concern ''is
acquiring peace of mind.11 120
In a lengthy conversation with Rieux, Tarrou reveals 
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that his father was a lawyer who was instrumental in imposing 
the death penalty on criminals. This so horrified Tarrou 
that he ran away from home and dedicated his life to fighting 
the death penalty. First he joined a social resistance group 
but soon realized that they too imposed the death penalty. 
If Tarrou is ever to gain the peace of mind he desires, he 
must walk "The path of sympathy," and avoid condemning any­
one to death.
12 1 
Tarrou knows that his fight against the death penalty 
and his fight against the plague are one and the same: he 
must fight evil, be it human or natural, that senselessly 
puts men to death. Through this fight Tarrou hopes to become 
a saint, but when Rieux reminds him that he does not believe 
in God, he replies: "Exactly! Can one be a saint without 
God!--that's the problem, in fact the only problem, I'm up 
. t t d 
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agains o ay. Here we have another aspect of Camus' 
lion hero: to love and fight for man without relying on the 
rewards of God for motivation--to become a saint without God, 
without anything beyond the labyrinth. 
Bernard Rieux--the doctor and, it turns out, the narra­
tor of the novel--is the fourth example of Camus' lion hero. 
When Rambert first encounters the doctor, he wants some in­
formation on the sanitary conditions among the Arab popula­
tion of Oran. But Rieux refuses to give any information 
unless Rambert will publish a complete condemnation of the 
conditions because he will accept nothing but the full truth. 
When Rambert replies, "You talk the language of Saint-Just," 
Rieux thinks to himself: 
The language he used was that of a man who was 
sick and tired of the world he lived in--though 
he had much liking for his fellow men--and had 
resolved, for his part, to have no truck with 
injustice and compromises with the truth.123
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His desire for complete honesty and his commitment to helping 
his fellow citizens during the epidemic are the elements of 
his lion-like heroism, and, like Grand, Rambert, and Tarrou 
he is willing to fight the plague without any hope of an 
eternal reward for his service. 
Rieux tells us that during the plague many "fledgling 
moralists" tried to explain why the plague had come and what 
course of action should be taken; the two most common were 
the Christian explanation and the fatalist explanation. 
The narrator of the story sums up how a lion hero will react 
to the senseless evil in the world--not with words and ex­
planations but with actions: 
And Tarrou, Rieux, and their friends might give 
one answer or another, but its conclusion was 
always the same, their certitude that a fight must 
be put up, in this way or that, and there must 
be no bowing down. The essential thing was to 
save the greatest possible number of persons from 
dying and being doomed to unending separation. 1 24
To take up this battle against the plague without the hope 
of reward from God in the next life is what makes these four 
characters representative of Nietzsche's lion. They take on 
the dragon of the traditional Christian value system and 
its explanations of evil and win this battle because they 
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fight the plague without relying on the extrinsic value 
system and its explanations of evil and win this battle 
because they fight the plague without relying on the extrin­
sic value system that it represents: 
Nonetheless, he knew that the tale he had to tell 
could not be one of a final victory. It could 
only be the record of what had to be done again 
in the never ending fight against terror and its 
relentless onslaughts, despite their personal 
afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints 
but refusing to bow down to �estilences, strive
their utmost to be healers.l 5 
None of Camus' heroes become saints, but neither is Nietz­
sche's lion a saint, for that, we need the third stage of his 
overman--the child, which is personified in Zorba The Greek. 
Kazantzakis and the Child 
-- The. child �-6 �nnocence and 6okgett�ng, 
a new beginning, a game., a -6e.l6-pkopelled 
whe.e.l, a 6�k-6t movement, a -6a.cked "ye.-6." --
Nietzsche's Zarathustra 
In his autobiography, Report to Greco, Kazantzakis tells 
of how a young girl came up to him in a library in Paris with 
a picture of Nietzsche, telling Kazantzakis it looked just 
like him. She was so surprised that Kazantzakis did not know 
it was Nietzsche that she gave him a copy of Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra: "That was one of the most decisive moments of 
life," writes Kazantzakis.126 Levitt points out just how
decisive this encounter was: 
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His dissertation, completed in 1909 was on "Fried­
rich Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Right"; he 
translated Zarathustra and The Birth of Tragedy 
into demotic Greek; he followed the path of 
Nietzsche across Europe as if on a "pilgrimage" 
and for years kept a deathmask of the philosopher 
over the doorways to his various homes. 1 27
Andreas Poulakidas contends that Kazantzakis met the real 
George Zorba while he was in the process of translating Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, and it was George Zorba who "unknowingly 
converted" Nietzsche's philosophy "into flesh and blood, 
into a living reality, • Kazantzakis realized this, and 
was able to develop his hero, Alexis Zorba into the 
real overman that Zarathustra was seeking "
128 This evi-
dence shows that not only was Kazantzakis very familiar with 
Nietzsche's allegory, but that he also used it as a model for 
his own overman: Alexis Zorba. This is the philosophical 
ideal which Kazantzakis wanted to portray in his novel, plac­
ing it within the criteria for allegory in Chapter One. Since 
the "child" stage is the final "metamorphoses" of the over­
man, we can use the description of Nietzsche's overman in 
Chapter Two as a comparative device to show how Kazantzakis 
uses this ideal as his model for Zorba The Greek. 
The child is "innocence" and a "new beginning," says 
Zarathustra, and Alexis Zorba embodies both of these qual-
ities: "Like a child, he IzorbaJ sees everything for the 
first time,11 1 29 with all the freshness and innocence of Adam.
This aspect of Zorba's nature never fails to amaze the Boss, 
who understands that this 
is how great visionaries and poets see every­
thing--as if for the first time. Each morning 
they see a new world before their eyes; they do 
not really see it, they create it. 130
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If the overman is to create a new yalue system, then he must 
approach the world like Zorba, combining both innocence and 
Nietzschean pride. 
This pride is essential for the overman and Zorba be­
cause they must be the reference point for their value sys-
terns. Zorba's reaction to the Boss' question, "But don't you 
believe in anything?" shows that Zorba considers himself as 
his reference point: 
No I don't believe in anything. How many times 
must I tell you that? I don't believe in anything 
or anyone; only in Zorba. Not because Zorba is 
better than others; not at all, not a little bit! 
He's a brute like the rest! But I believe in 
Zorba because he's the only being I have in my 
power, the only one I know. 1 31 
Zorba knows his ego is the only reference point he has, and 
all his values proceed from and are derived from his will. 
Remembering that Nietzsche contends that this will 
created all the opposing, dualistic forces in a value system 
such as Spenser's, we should see Zorba the overman fusing 
together opposites like God and Satan, good and evil, heaven 
and hell. During their Easter feast, Zorba explains his 
view of God to the Boss: 
God enjoys himself, kills, commits injustice, 
makes love, works, likes impossible things, just 
the same as I do. He eats what he pleases; takes 
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the woman he chooses. If you see a lovely woman 
going by, . • .  Suddenly the ground opens and 
she disappears. Where does she go? Who takes 
her? If she's a good woman, they say "God has 
taken her." If she's a harlot, they say: "The 
devil's carried her off." But, boss, I've said 
it before, and I say it again� God and the devil
are one and the same thing! l3L 
If God and the devil are one in same, there will not be an 
absolute reference point to determine man's ethics. Then 
how is one to tell the difference between good and evil? 
Again, the individual, as his own reference point, will decide 
what good and evil mean. 13 3 For Zorba good means full be-
cause this is the only life he can be sure of living: "The 
only thing that makes any difference is whether I'm alive 
or dead. Whether the devil or God calls me . . . I shall die 
t • t k • d t • k l t II 13
4
urn in o a ree ing corpse, an s in peop e ou . 
Zorba is, like a child, inconsistent in his view of 
God--saying at one point "there's no God and no devil," but 
later saying, "I can't say I do I _believe in God.J either. I 
can't for the life of me.11 135 But Zorba is not a metaphys­
ician, nor does he care to be one; he is concerned only with 
his immediate, existential situation: 
Yet, if there is a God, I shan't be afraid to appear 
before him when the time comes- I don't know how 
to put it to make you understand. I don't think 
any of that's important, do you see? Would God 
bother to sit over the earthworms and keep count 
of everything they do? And get angry and storm 
and fret himself silly because one went astray 
with the female earthworm next door or swallowed 
a mouthful of meat on Good Friday? Bah! Get 
away with you, all you soup-swilling priests! 
Bah! 136 
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The final line of this speech of Zorba's reveals his atti­
tude towards the organized religion of the priests which 
dictates the morals of the people with the threat of eternal 
punishment. When the Boss and Zorba visit the monastery, 
Zorba is described as "suffocating" while in the building, 
and as he finds out just how corrupt the priests are, he 
calls them "Swine! Liars! M 1 I 11137 u es. Zorba soon discovers
that the priests shot the young monk, Demetrios, and as he 
and the Boss ride away on their horses, he cries out, "Give 
me your curses, Holy Fathersi 11138
Although Zorba despises the Christianity of the priests, 
his attitude towards Christ himself is very different. Dur­
ing their Easter feast, Zorba exults, "Come on, let's cele-
brate the Resurrection, boss! . •  Christ is reborn, my 
friend! 11 39 This is similar to Nietzsche's attitude towards
Christ; his attack was against the organized Christianity 
of the German churches, not against Christ himself: 
Mankind lies on its knees before the opposite 
of that which was the origin, the meaning, the 
right of the evangel; in the concept of "church" 
it has pronounced holy precisely what the "bringer 
of the glad tidings" felt to be beneath and behind 
himself--one would look in vain for a greater 
example of world-historical irony. 140 
So Nietzsche's overman, like Zorba, fuses and unites together 
another of the central dualisms of a value system such as 
Spenser's--the distinction between Christian and non-Chris-
tian. Zorba gives us an indication of how he perceives this 
fusion when he tells the Boss what remains acceptable for 
him in the Christian conception of life: "There's something 
which stays, something that's saved and turns into good humor, 
dancing, singing, wrangling even--that's what I call Resur­
rection.11 141
This last quote gives us a synopsis of the values Zorba 
and Nietzsche's overman advocate, the first of which is "good 
humor." In a conversation with Zorba, Zaharia--the "mad," 
runaway monk--claims that 
God must like fun and laughter. "Come inside 
my little buffoon, come inside," he'll say to 
me one day, I know. "Come and make me laugh! " 
That's the way I'll get into Paradise, as a 
buffoon! 
When Zorba hears this, he jumps up and says, "You'v� got your 
head screwed on the right way, old fellow! 11142 Zarathustra-­
who said "we should call every truth false which was not accom­
panied by at least one laugh 11 43 --would certainly agree with
Zorba; furthermore, he asserts 
What has so far been the greatest sin here on earth? 
Was it not the word of him who said, "Woe unto 
those who laugh here?" Did he himself find no 
reasons for laughing? Then he searched very badly. 
Even a child could find reasons here. 144 
Zorba is just such a child because he has no problems finding 
plenty to laugh about on this earth, inside this labyrinth. 
Another value shared by the overman and Zorba is their 
love for the dance, which in many respects symbolizes all
the values they represent and advocate. Zarathustra will
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"believe only in a god who could dance," and Zerba swears 
"the gods and devils must talk to each other" by dancing.
145 
Both Nietzsche and Kazantzakis use the image of the dionysian 
dance to characterize their heroes as being overcome by the 
rapture of excessive joy and laughter, and this spirit of 
excess is one of the highest values in both writer's value 
systems. When Zorba totally exhausts himself in a dance, the 
Boss asks what made him do it: "What could I do Boss? My 
joy was choking me. I had to find some outlet.11
146 
This 
14 7 philosophy of excess, of "no half-measures," is what Zara-
thustra says will kill the ''spirit of gravity," which is his 
arch-enemy and devil. 
Since this value of excess is the opposite of Chris­
tian value of temperance--personified by Sir Guyon in Spen­
ser's The Faerie Queene--we can conclude that Nietzsche's 
overman, his child, and Alexis Zorba, Kazantzakis' child, 
create a new value system, a "new beginning." This system is 
not based on an extrinsic reference point--such as God--but 
on an intrinsic reference point--the creative, willing ego of 
the overman--located directly in the labyrinth instead of 
outside it. Because their values are centered around this 
earth and this life, Nietzsche's overman and Ale�is Zorba 
both value, above all, a life that affirms and embraces this 
world in all its beauty and ugliness: they both proclaim a 
sacred "Yes" on existence. 
CONCLUSION 
Friedrich Nietzsche's incisive psychological analysis 
of his ''age's highest aspirations" is, in many ways, the 
most complete diagnosis of the profound shift in the values 
of Western Culture. Reacting to Darwin's conclusion that 
man is a natural rather than divine creation, Nietzsche 
advocated a new value system based on loyalty to the earth 
to replace the old value system based on loyalty to heaven. 
The infuluence of Nietzsche's philosophy of value extends 
deeply into most fields of modern, humanistic thought: in 
philosophy, Heidegger and Sartre--in theology, Buber and 
Tillich--in ·psychology, Freud and Jung--and, as this thesis 
sought to prove, in literature, Kafka, Camus, and Kazantza­
kis. 
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These last three authors have each written an example 
of a modern allegory (The Castle, The Plague, and Zorba The 
Greek) which I have interpreted as personifying the three 
developmental stages of Nietzsche's overman. If these three 
works represent attempts by man to learn to live in his 
world--his labyrinth--without the consolation and hope of 
an after-life or an extrinsic sanction for his values, then 
I offer these generalizations. 
Kafka--the ''camel"--depicts man caught in a power 
struggle with the prevailing value system of his culture. 
K. is required to load himself with the burden of the
Castle's values if he wants to be accepted in the culture-­
the village. Yet he soon realizes that the values of the 
Castle are not effective when he is forced to deal with the 
reality of his present, existential situation. K. is an 
allegorical example of a modern man who seeks sanction for 
his actions and values outside the labyrinth: after load­
ing alien values on himself like Nietzsche's camel, K. dies 
as a result of his futile attempts to gain recognition from 
the Castle--which represents the divine, heavenly realm. 
79 
In The Plague, Camus portrays the overman in the "lion" 
stage, fighting with the evil of the plague and with the 
Christian explanation for it. His four main characters-­
Rieux, Tarrou, Rambert, and Grand--all choose to fight the 
plague without the hope of a reward in the after-life. Un­
like Father Paneloux, who seeks an explanation for the evil 
of the plague in a source outside the labyrinth, these men 
are willing to face the evil within the labyrinth without 
an explanation or justification from an extrinsic, external 
source--like God. 
Kazantzakis uses his character, Zorba, to personify 
the overman in the final stage of development--the "child." 
In this stage, man has learned how to embrace his world in 
all of its paradoxical beauty. Like Nietzsche's child, 
Zorba fuses together the dualistic opposites--God and Devil, 
Heaven and Hell, Good and Evil--of the Christian value system 
to create his own values that allow him to accept and love 
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his labyrinthian world without an extrinsic sanction for his 
values. 
Following in Nietzsche's path, Kafka, Camus, and Kaz­
antzakis all reject Christian, teleological values in favor 
of Existential, humanistic values. Like Nietzsche, the em­
phasis of their value system is on man and bis reaction to 
the realization that there is nothing beyond the labyrinth. 
These three modern writers portray the abstract ideal of 
Nietzsche's overman in the narrative lines of their novels, 
synthesizing the two levels of meaning necessary for alle­
gorical literature, and synthesizing the two primary threads 
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